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1 Introduction
While large democratic elections are a means for voters to influence the outcome, the ratio-
nal theory literature (Downs 1957) has shown that purely consequentialist motives cannot
explain the turnout rates observed in large political elections. This “paradox of voting” is
due to the low probability for each voter of being pivotal (Ledyard 1981; Palfrey and Rosen-
thal 1985; Myerson 2000; Dhillon and Peralta 2002; Feddersen 2004). Several alternative
theoretical approaches (Waas and Blais 2017) can be imagined, based on the empirical evi-
dence that the decision to vote is correlated with an impressive set of variables (Smets and
van Ham 2013). In particular, both social (Gerber et al. 2008; Rogers et al. 2017) and
ethical (Blais 2000; Blais and Achen 2019) motives appear important. The ethical motive
for voting was first modelled as satisfaction derived from complying with a norm (Riker and
Ordeshook 1968; Fiorina 1976; Schuessler 2000).1 Based on Harsanyi (1977, 1980), ethical
voters were then modelled as civic-minded citizens who are rule utilitarians : they select a
voting strategy that maximizes the total welfare of like-minded voters, which would obtain
if all like-minded ethical voters selected it. Each ethical voter thus acts like a social planner
for the group, generating positive equilibrium turnout rates that trade off the probability of
winning against the group-aggregate cost of voting (Coate and Conlin 2002; Feddersen and
Sandroni 2006; Feddersen et al 2009; Krishna and Morgan 2015; Bierbrauer et al. 2019).
We propose a novel formalization of ethical voters, which imposes a less demanding
ethical standard than rule utilitarianism by taking voters to have a mix of purely selfish and
moral concerns. Moreover, the voters in our model are equipped with preferences —dubbed
Homo moralis— shown to be plausible from an evolutionary perspective (Alger and Weibull
2013).2 In a two-player game, a Homo moralis using strategy x when the opponent uses
strategy y achieves utility
U (x, y) = (1− κ) · π (x, y) + κ · π (x, x) ,
where π(x, y) is the individual’s material payoff, given the strategies effectively used, and
π(x, x) is the material payoff that the individual would obtain if, hypothetically, the opponent
were instead to use the same strategy as him/her. The second term captures a Kantian moral
concern, and κ ∈ [0, 1] is the individual’s degree of morality. Immanuel Kant (1785) wrote
“Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should
1A voter’s satisfaction may also stem from helping sustain democracy or expressing political views.
2Our approach is thus close in spirit to Conley et al. 2006.
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become a universal law.” By maximizing the weighted sum of own material payoff and the
Kantian moral concern, Homo moralis can be said to “act according to that maxim whereby
you can at the same time will that others should do likewise with some probability.”Alger
and Weibull (2013) show that evolution favors Homo moralis preferences with κ equal to the
probability with which individuals carrying rare mutant preferences get to interact. We take
this result as our starting point and examine voters’ decisions to participate in an election,
assuming that they have Homo moralis preferences.
We model an election with two candidates. Prior to voting, each voter learns his own
party preference but not the aggregate party preference distribution. Each voter chooses a
costly level of effort, which determines the probability of managing to vote on time. In the ex
ante setting (resp. ex post setting), voters select their voting strategies prior to (resp. after)
learning their party preference. We model the electorate as a continuum, thus eliminating
instrumental motives for voting. When contemplating a course of action, a Homo moralis
evaluates what his material payoff would be if, hypothetically, a share κ of the population
to which he belongs would follow the same course of action.3 Our findings are as follows.
In the symmetric setting—where the candidates enjoy equally large expected support—
for any strictly positive κ there exists a unique equilibrium, with a strictly positive turnout
rate (with one notable exception: the ex ante setting when the electorate is evenly divided
in each state of Nature, not only in expected terms). With a convex effort cost function
and a negligible marginal cost for small effort levels, voters can make a sizeable effort even
if they attach a weight of only 0.1 or 0.2 to the Kantian moral concern.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, a positive degree of morality is not sufficient to generate
a positive turnout from the supporters of both parties: in asymmetric settings where one
party is highly likely to be supported by a strong majority, voters who support the other
party do not vote.
Whether in the symmetric ex ante or ex post setting, the equilibrium turnout rate is in-
creasing in the degree of morality: by bolstering the hypothetical effect of his effort envisaged
by a Homo moralis, an increase in κ raises the utility benefit of exerting costly effort.
Finally, the equilibrium turnout is lower in the ex ante than in the ex post setting. Behind
the veil of ignorance as to his eventual party preference, a Homo moralis internalizes the
effect that his voting effort has on both of his incarnations. This consideration is absent in the
ex post scenario, where Homo moralis preferences make voters adopt a partisan standpoint.
3We refer to our companion paper (Alger and Laslier, 2020) for an explanation for why the utility of
Homo moralis in a continuum population takes this form.
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2 The model
Consider an infinitely large population of voters, modelled as a continuum with mass 1.
There are two political parties, A and B, and two states of Nature: in state ωA a majority
qA ≥ 1/2 prefers A over B; in state ωB a majority qB ≥ 1/2 prefers B over A. State ωA
occurs with probability a ∈ (0, 1) and state ωB with probability b = 1 − a. Prior to each
election, Nature first draws the state and then a party preference P (i) ∈ {A,B} for each
voter i. Each voter observes his realized preference but not the state of Nature.
Each voter cares about the margin with which his preferred party wins or loses. This
assumption is natural for parliamentary elections, where margins determine the number
of seats obtained. But it may also be reasonable in winner-take-all elections, for example
because such margins have effects on the ability of candidates to raise funds. Formally, let
v (δ) denote the material utility that a voter obtains from margin δ ∈ [−1, 1], where v is
strictly increasing. Material utility encompasses both the utility associated with the concrete
effects of the election outcome on laws, taxes, and government spending, and psychological
benefits or costs derived from the relative power of the two parties. We take the cost of
seeing one’s preferred party lose by a margin δ to equal the benefit of seeing one’s preferred
party win by the same margin δ:
v (δ) = −v (−δ) for all δ ∈ [−1, 1] . (1)
Letting v be twice continuously differentiable and concave for δ > 0, v is then convex for
δ < 0, and
v′ (δ) = v′ (−δ) and v′′ (δ) = −v′′ (−δ) . (2)
An example of such a function is
v (δ) = δ (2 + δ) (2− δ) , (3)
for which v′ (δ) = 4− 3δ2 and v′′ (δ) = −6δ.
A voter who participates in the election votes for his preferred party. The probability that
a voter reaches the voting booth on time and manages to vote is determined by his effort,
a one-dimensional aggregate measure of time devoted to registering, efforts to overcome
“obstacles” that may appear on the way to the voting booth (family and/or professional
obligations, illness, inclement weather, etc), and attention devoted to avoiding behaviors
that would annul the vote. Letting the probability of voting success be linear in effort, we
let effort be a number between 0 and 1. The cost of exerting effort e ∈ [0, 1] is c (e), where c
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is a continuously differentiable and strictly convex function, with c′ (0) = 0 and c′ (1) = +∞.
Denote by eP (i) (i) ∈ [0, 1] the effort of a voter i with party preference P (i) ∈ {A,B}. Let
the mass of voters be described by the interval [0, 1] with the Lebesgue measure. Because
the allocation of preference to voters is random, the expected number of voters of type A
who vote is: ∫ 1
0
1P (i)=A eA(i) di.
Since, by assumption, the probability of being of a given type depends only on the state of
nature, we will slightly abuse notation and write the above integral as follows in state ωA:∫ qA
0
eA(i) di.







eB (i) di, (4)







eA (i) di. (5)
We will characterize type-homogenous equilibria, in which all the voters with the same party
preference exert the same effort. If eA and eB denote these efforts, the expected margins in
state A and B take the following simple forms:
δA = qAeA − (1− qA) eB (6)
and
δB = qBeB − (1− qB) eA. (7)
We distinguish between the ex ante and the ex post scenario, depending on whether each
voter chooses a voting strategy before or after learning his party preference.
3 The ex ante scenario
In this scenario each voter i chooses a pair of efforts (eA (i) , eB (i)) ∈ [0, 1]2 before learning
his party preference P (i) ∈ {A,B}. Our goal is to characterize symmetric equilibria, where
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all voters choose the same effort pair. If all the other voters use some effort pair (eA, eB),
the expected material utility of a voter i who selects the effort pair (eA(i), eB(i)) is:
π (eA (i) , eB (i) , eA, eB) = aqAv (δA) + b(1− qB)v (−δB)− [aqA + b(1− qB)] c (eA (i)) (8)
+a(1− qA)v (−δA) + bqBv (δB)− [a(1− qA) + bqB] c (eB (i)) .
The first line is the expected material utility that the voter achieves if he turns out preferring
party A, in which case he exerts effort eA(i) and enjoys material benefit v(δA) in state ωA
and v(−δB) in state B. Since each voter has measure zero, the expected margins are indeed
independent of i’s efforts (eA(i), eB(i)). The second line is his expected material utility if he
turns out preferring party B.
Prior to defining Homo moralis preferences, we state the following proposition (whose
trivial proof is omitted).
Proposition 1 Voters with Homo oeconomicus preferences, represented by the expected ma-
terial utility in (8), exert no voting effort.
Each voter being atomistic, his effort has no effect on the election outcome. Since voting is
costly, purely instrumentally motivated voters do not participate.4
A voter with Homo Moralis preferences and degree of morality κ ∈ [0, 1] achieves the
following utility from the effort pair (eA (i) , eB (i)) when the other voters use the effort pair
(eA, eB):





























B = δB + κ [qB(eB(i)− eB)− (1− qB)(eA(i)− eA)] . (11)
The first line in (9) is the voter’s expected material payoff if he turns out preferring party A,




B that would obtain if, hypothetically, a share
κ of the other voters selected (eA (i) , eB (i)) instead of (eA, eB). For example, if eA(i) > eA,
4For the same reason, any consequentialistic utility function—even if it represents altruistic inclination
towards the other voters rather than pure material self-interest—would generate zero effort.
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the expected margin of party A would thus (hypothetically) increase by κqA [eA (i)− eA] in
state of nature ωA, while that of party B would be reduced by κ (1− qB) [eA (i)− eA] in state
of nature ωB. Because i’s effort cost does not depend on the voting strategies of other voters,
however, it is the true expected cost that appears in the utility in (9). The special case κ = 0
yields the familiar Homo oeconomicus preferences, examined above. The remainder of this
section restricts attention to strictly positive degrees of morality κ ∈ (0, 1].
Using the symmetry of v (see (1)) we rewrite (9) as follows:













− [aqA + b(1− qB)] c (eA (i))− [a(1− qA) + bqB] c (eB (i)) .
Hence, the marginal utilities of efforts eA(i) and eB(i) are, respectively:









− [ aqA + b(1− qB) ] c′ (eA (i)) (13)









− [ bqB + a(1− qA) ] c′ (eB (i)) . (14)
These equations immediately reveal that the expected marginal benefit (the first line in
each equation) is nil if the voters are evenly split between the two parties in both states
(qA = qB = 1/2); equilibrium efforts are then nil. The reason is clear: given the symmetry
on v, if qA = qB = 1/2 the benefit a voter garners from making effort when incarnated as an
A-supporter would be exactly offset by the reduction in benefit this effort generates for the
voter incarnated as a B-supporter, and vice versa. Costly effort is therefore not warranted.
Does this also mean that effort is nil in any setting where the voter is equally likely to end
up as an A-supporter or a B-supporter (i.e., when a(2qA − 1) = (1 − a)(2qB − 1))? No:
the following proposition shows that, except in the special case where the voters are always
evenly split (qA = qB = 1/2), a voter with Homo moralis preferences with positive degree
of morality κ > 0 exerts a strictly positive effort, for at least one of the party preference
realizations.
Proposition 2 For any degree of morality κ ∈ (0, 1], the zero-effort strategy profile (e∗A, e∗B) =
(0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if qA = qB = 1/2.
This result obtains because the marginal cost is nil at zero effort and even the smallest strictly
positive value of κ makes the voter evaluate the consequences of voting effort as if it had an
7
impact on the outcome of the vote. Intuitive though as this result may seem, it is surprising
that some strictly positive effort is undertaken even in the setting where the voter is equally
likely to end up as an A-supporter or a B-supporter, i.e., when a(2qA−1) = (1−a)(2qB−1).
Indeed, as mentioned above, from an ex ante perspective any voting effort for one particular
party then stands an equal chance of benefiting and harming the voter. Given that voting
is costly, one could have expected that voters would then have preferred to refrain from
voting. We will next deepen the analysis of the symmetric setting to better understand this
result. Prior to this, however, we use a numerical example to show that a positive κ does
not necessarily induce a positive effort for both party preference realizations.
Example 1 Let v (δ) = δ (2 + δ) (2− δ) and c(e) = we/(1−e). With these functional forms,
the algebraic computations can be handled by Mathematica. Take w = 2/10, qA = 8/10, and
qB = 7/10. In the ex ante scenario:
1. For κ = 1/10 and a = 1/2, the only equilibrium is interior: (e∗A, e
∗
B) ' (.219, .142).




3. If the asymmetry increases sufficiently, turnout for one of the parties vanishes. For
κ = 1/10 and a = 3/4, (e∗A, e
∗
B) ' (.282, 0).
We now analyze further the symmetric setting, in which both states of the world are
equally likely and the share of voters who support party A in state ωA equals the share of
voters who support party B in state ωB, i.e., a = 1/2 and qA = qB ≡ q. Given the previous
proposition, we restrict attention to the non-trivial case where a strict majority of voters
prefer party P in state ωP , i.e., q ∈ (1/2, 1]. In this setting each voter votes with a strictly
positive probability, which does not depend on the voter’s party preference.
Proposition 3 Consider a symmetric setting (a = 1/2, qA = qB ≡ q) in which q > 1/2.
For any degree of morality κ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium
(e∗A, e
∗
B). This equilibrium entails a positive effort that is independent of party preference,
i.e., e∗A = e
∗
B ≡ e∗ > 0.







A positive voting effort e∗ makes the voters achieve a positive margin
δ∗ = (2q − 1)e∗ (16)
for the majority at hand, a margin that generates an expected material benefit [q − (1 −
q)]v(δ∗) to the voter (with probability q he is in the majority, and thus enjoys a positive
margin of victory, but with the complementary probability he is in the minority and suffers
from a loss). A positive degree of morality κ > 0 provides the voter with the satisfaction
associated with the marginal effect κ(2q − 1) that his level of effort would have on this
margin, should a share κ of the other voters make the same effort. Hence, a costly effort is
warranted.
The following proposition reports comparative statics results for the symmetric setting.
Proposition 4 Consider a symmetric setting (a = 1/2, qA = qB ≡ q). If v′′′ ≤ 0:
• for any q ∈ (1/2, 1], e∗ is strictly increasing in κ;
• for any κ ∈ (0, 1] there exists a threshold value q̃ ∈ (1/2, 1] such that e∗ is strictly
increasing in q for q ≤ q̃ and strictly decreasing in q for q > q̃.
Ceteris paribus an increase in the degree of Kantian morality induces a higher participation
rate, because an increase in κ bolsters the margin that would obtain if, hypothetically, a
share κ of the other voters exerted the same effort as the voter at hand, and thus bolsters
the satisfaction that this voter derives from exerting effort. By contrast, since the marginal
cost of voting effort is increasing while its marginal material benefit is decreasing, an increase
in the degree of partisanship q would not necessarily raise participation, for a given degree
of morality κ.
4 The ex post scenario
In this scenario each voter i chooses an effort eP (i) (i) ∈ [0, 1] upon learning her party
preference P (i) ∈ {A,B}. Our goal is to derive results for type-homogenous equilibria
(êA, êB), where all the voters with a preference for party A (resp. B) exert the same effort
êA (resp. êB). By contrast to the ex ante analysis, here a voter updates her beliefs about
the state of nature upon observing her party preference, and the material utility is evaluated
given the realized party preference. Thus, given that all the other A-supporters exert effort
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eA and all the B-supporters exert effort eB, the expected material utility of an A-supporter
i who exerts effort eA(i) is:
π̂ (eA (i) , eA, eB) = â · v (δA) + (1− â) · v (−δB)− c (eA (i)) , (17)
where â is i’s posterior belief that the state is ωA given that she prefers party A:
â = Pr [ωA|P (i) = A] =
a · qA
a · qA + b · (1− qB)
. (18)
Likewise, the expected material utility of a B-supporter who exerts effort eB(i), given the
efforts eA and eB exerted by the other voters, is:




· v (−δA)− c (eB (i)) , (19)
where b̂ is her posterior belief that the state is favorable for party B, i.e., ωB:
b̂ = Pr [ωB|P (i) = B] =
b · qB
b · qB + a · (1− qA)
. (20)
Before defining Homo moralis preferences, we observe that, as in the ex ante scenario, voters
with Homo economicus preferences exert no voting effort (again the trivial proof is omitted).
Proposition 5 Voters with Homo oeconomicus preferences, represented by the expected ma-
terial utilities in (17) and (19), exert no voting effort.
Turning now to Homo Moralis preferences, in the ex post scenario a voter with such
preferences and a degree of morality κ ∈ (0, 1] evaluates what her expected material utility
would be, should a share κ of the voters with the same party preference choose the same
effort (instead of a share of all the voters as in the ex ante scenario). Formally, for any
type-homogenous effort profile (eA, eB) ∈ [0, 1]2 used by the other voters, an A-supporter
achieves the following utility from exerting effort eA(i):
U
(κ)
A (eA(i), eA, eB) = â · v(δ
(A,κ)
A ) + (1− â) · v(−δ
(A,κ)




A = δA + κqA[eA(i)− eA], (22)
−δ(A,κ)B = −δB + κ(1− qB)[eA(i)− eA]. (23)
If a share κ of the other A-supporters were to choose the same effort as the individual
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herself instead of their actual effort eA, the expected margin of party A would change by
κqA [eA (i)− eA] in state of nature ωA (see (22)), while the expected margin of party B would
change by κ (1− qB) [eA (i)− eA] in state of nature ωB (see (23)). As in the ex ante scenario,
the utility cost of effort in (21) is unaffected by κ.
Likewise, a B-supporter achieves the following utility from exerting effort eB(i):
U
(κ)
B (eB(i), eA, eB) = b̂ · v(δ
(B,κ)
B ) + (1− b̂) · v(−δ
(B,κ)




B = δB + κqB[eB(i)− eB] (25)
and
−δ(B,κ)A = −δA + κ(1− qA)[eB(i)− eB]. (26)
A type-homogenous equilibrium (êA, êB) solves the following fixed-point problem: êA ∈ arg maxeA(i)∈[0,1] U
(κ)
A (eA(i), êA, êB)
êB ∈ arg maxeB(i)∈[0,1] U
(κ)
B (eB(i), êA, êB).
(27)
We first prove that in any such equilibrium (if it exists), all voters exert a positive effort.
To see this, consider first the marginal utility of effort of a voter i with party preference




′(δ(A,κ)A )+ (1− qB) (1− â) v′(− δ(A,κ)B )]− c′ (eA (i)) . (28)
For any type-homogenous efforts eA and eB exerted by the other voters, the assumptions
v′(·) > 0 and c′ (0) = 0 imply that when evaluated at eA (i) = 0, this expression is strictly
positive for any κ ∈ (0, 1]. Since the same remark applies to the marginal utility of a voter
i with party preference P (i) = B, we have proved the following result.
Proposition 6 For any degree of morality κ ∈ (0, 1], any type-homogenous equilibrium
(êA, êB) is such that all the voters exert a positive effort: êA > 0 and êB > 0.
This result contrasts with the ex ante scenario, in which a positive degree of morality is not
sufficient to generate a strictly positive effort for all parameter constellations.
Example 2 For the same parameters as in Example 1,in the ex post scenario:
1. For κ = 1/10 and a = 1/2, (êA, êB) ' (.339, .320).
2. For κ = 1 and a = 1/2, (êA, êB) ' (.718, .711).
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3. For κ = 1/10 and a = 3/4, (êA, êB) ' (.359, .280).
Equilibrium existence is more challenging to prove than in the ex ante scenario, and we
had to add some conditions to do so; these additional conditions are, however, not necessary
to prove that if an equilibrium exists it is unique, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Consider a symmetric setting (a = 1/2, qA = qB ≡ q ≥ 1/2). For any
κ ∈ (0, 1] there exists a unique candidate for a symmetric type-homogenous equilibrium
(êA, êB) = (ê, ê). For (ê, ê) to be an equilibrium it is sufficient that v
′′′ (δ) ≤ 0 for δ ∈ [0, 1]
and c′′′(e) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ [0, 1].
Prior to comparing the equilibrium effort in the ex post scenario to that in the ex ante
scenario, we show that the comparative statics are qualitatively the same as in the ex ante
scenario.
Proposition 8 Consider a symmetric setting (a = 1/2, qA = qB ≡ q). If v′′′ ≤ 0:
• for any q ∈ (1/2, 1], ê is strictly increasing in κ;
• for any κ ∈ (0, 1] there exists a threshold value q̂ ∈ (1/2, 1] such that ê is strictly
increasing in q for q ≤ q̂ and strictly decreasing in q for q > q̂.
Propositions 6 and 7 imply that if an equilibrium exists in the symmetric case, it is
implicitly defined by this equation:
κ
[






= c′ (ê) . (29)
As in the ex ante scenario, a positive voting effort ê makes the independent voters achieve a
positive margin
δ̂ = (2q − 1)ê (30)
for the majority at hand. However, the marginal benefit of this margin is not the same as
in the ex ante setting. For the sake of illustration consider a voter who prefers party A.
The term [q2 + (1− q)2] in (29) captures both the benefit of increasing the margin of victory
when A is the majority party and the benefit of decreasing the victory margin when B is the
majority party. Indeed, in the symmetric setting, the posterior belief of this voter that the





is the marginal expected utility benefit from increasing
the victory margin in state ωA (in which an effort increase raises the hypothetical margin




is the marginal expected utility
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benefit for the A-supporter at hand from decreasing the victory margin of party B in state
ωB (in which an effort increase reduces the hypothetical margin envisaged by Homo moralis
by κ(1− q)).
Intuition suggests that voters exert more effort in the ex post than in the ex ante scenario,
since in the latter the voters internalize the fact that they may end up preferring either
party, whereas in the former preferences are purely partisan. A glance at the equations that
implicitly define e∗ (see (15)) and ê (see (29)) reveals that the comparison hinges on the
terms q2 + (1 − q)2 and (2q − 1)2. Since q2 + (1 − q)2 > (2q − 1)2 for any q ∈ [1/2, 1], we
immediately obtain the following result, which confirms the intuition.
Proposition 9 Consider a symmetric setting (a = 1/2, qA = qB ≥ 1/2). For any degree
of morality κ ∈ (0, 1], the equilibrium effort ê in the ex post scenario strictly exceeds the
equilibrium effort e∗ in the ex ante scenario.
5 Conclusion
Our exploratory analysis shows that the evolutionarily plausible class of Homo moralis pref-
erences can lead to high turnout rates in large elections. Moreover, equilibrium turnout rates
depend on the specifics of the election in hand. Since these preferences may be interpreted
as capturing a partially Kantian motivation, the model is arguably plausible also in light of
the ethical motive for voting often put forward by voters in surveys (Blais 2000).
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a voter who expects the other voters to exert no effort, (eA, eB) = 0. This implies
that when evaluated at eA(i) = eB(i) = 0, δ
(κ)
A = 0 = δ
(κ)
B , so that v
′(δ
(κ)




Simplification of (13) and (14) then lead to the following necessary and sufficient conditions
for (e∗A, e
∗
B) = (0, 0) to be a Nash equilibrium:
aqA(2qA − 1)− b(1− qB)(2qB − 1) ≤ 0 (31)
and
bqB(2qB − 1)− a(1− qA)(2qA − 1) ≤ 0. (32)
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The statement in the proposition then follows from three observations. First, qAqB > (1 −
qA)(1 − qB) implies that at least one of the conditions is violated (to see this, note that
aqA(2qA − 1)− b(1− qB)(2qB − 1) ≤ 0 then implies bqB(2qB − 1)− a(1− qA)(2qA − 1) > 0,
while bqB(2qB−1)−a(1−qA)(2qA−1) ≤ 0 then implies aqA(2qA−1)−b(1−qB)(2qB−1) > 0).
Second, since qA ≥ 1/2 and qB ≥ 1/2, qAqB ≤ (1− qA)(1− qB) if and only if qA = qB = 1/2.
Third, the two necessary and sufficient conditions are satisfied for qA = qB = 1/2. Q.E.D.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Since q > 1/2, Proposition 2 implies that either e∗A > 0 or e
∗
B > 0. Assume that there exists
an equilibrium such that e∗A > e
∗
B ≥ 0. At such an equilibrium, the necessary first-order





B, to zero. Since the term multiplying κ in δ
(κ)
A and in δ
(κ)
B (see (10) and (11)) then
equals zero, the first-order condition reduces to




A − (1− q)e∗B] (34)
δ∗B = [qe
∗
B − (1− q)e∗A]. (35)
Likewise, e∗B ∈ [0, e∗A) must satisfy the inequality
κ(2q − 1) [qv′(δ∗B)− (1− q)v′(δ∗A)] ≤ c′(e∗B). (36)
Now, e∗A > e
∗
B implies |δ∗A| > |δ∗B|. The assumptions on v (see (2)) then imply v′(δ∗B) > v′(δ∗A),
which in turn implies qv′(δ∗B)−(1−q)v′(δ∗A) > qv′(δ∗A)−(1−q)v′(δ∗B). Hence, the left-hand side
of (36) strictly exceeds that of (33). But together with strict convexity of c, this contradicts
e∗A > e
∗




B ≡ e∗ > 0, any such e∗ satisfies
the necessary first-order condition
κ(2q − 1)2v′((2q − 1)e∗) = c′(e∗). (37)
Existence and uniqueness follow from our assumptions on v and c. Q.E.D.
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6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
By some abuse of notation, let e∗ denote the function that to each pair (κ, q) ∈ (0, 1]×(1/2, 1]






c′(e∗)− κ2(2q − 1)3v′′(δ∗)
, (38)




4κ(2q − 1)v′(δ∗) + 2κ2(2q − 1)2e∗v′′(δ∗)




c′(e∗)− κ2(2q − 1)3v′′(δ∗)





κ(2q − 1)2v′(δ∗) + κ2(2q − 1)3e∗v′′(δ∗)




c′(e∗)− κ2(2q − 1)3v′′(δ∗)
·
[
v′(δ∗) +2 (2q − 1)e∗v′′(δ∗)
]
.






= sign [2v′(δ∗) + (2q − 1)e∗v′′(δ∗)] . (41)
Since (41) is strictly positive for q = 1/2, by continuity it is also strictly positive for q close
to 1/2. For e∗ to be increasing in q, the expression in (41) must be positive for q ∈ [1/2, 1].
Since δ∗ is increasing in e∗ and v is strictly concave, the first term would then decrease in q,
while the absolute value of the second term would increase in q. Hence, there may exist some
q̃ ∈ (1/2, 1] such that the sum of the two terms is nil for q = q̃. We show, by contradiction,
that e∗ must then be decreasing in q for q > q̃. Thus, consider some q̂ > q̃ and let ê∗ denote
the associated equilibrium effort. Suppose that there exists some ε > 0 such that e∗ ≥ ê∗
for all q ∈ [q̂, q̂+ ε]. But then (41) would be strictly negative for q ∈ (q̂, q̂+ ε], contradicting
the assumption that e∗ ≥ ê∗ for all q ∈ [q̂, q̂ + ε]. Q.E.D.
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6.4 Proof of Proposition 7
In the symmetric setting, â = b̂ = q. Consider a voter i with party preference P (i), and
assume that all the other voters make effort e∗ ∈ (0, 1). Then δA = δB = (2q − 1) e∗ ≡ δ,





eP (i) (i) , e
∗, e∗
)




eP (i) (i)− e∗
])
(42)
+ (1− q) · v
(
−δ + κ (1− q)
[







e∗ is a symmetric equilibrium iff eP (i)(i) = e













eP (i) (i)− e∗
])
(43)
+κ (1− q)2 · v′
(
−δ + κ (1− q)
[







replacing eP (i) (i) by e
∗ in (43) and equating the resulting expression to zero gives the nec-
essary first-order condition for e∗ to be a symmetric interior equilibrium. By symmetry of v
(see (2)), this condition reduces to:
κ[q2 + (1− q)2] · v′ ((2q − 1) e∗) = c′ (e∗) . (44)
The right-hand side is a strictly increasing function that equals 0 for e∗ = 0 and tends to
+∞ as e∗ tends to 1. For any κ > 0 the left-hand side is strictly positive for e∗ = 0, and it
is strictly decreasing since its derivative wrt e∗,
κ2 (2q − 1) [q2 + (1− q)2] · v′′ ((2q − 1) e∗) ,
is strictly negative. We conclude that (44) has a unique interior solution e∗ ∈ (0, 1). To











]2 = (κ)2 q3 · v′′ (δ + κq [eP (i) (i)− e∗]) (45)
(κ)2 (1− q)3 · v′′
(
−δ + κ (1− q)
[







When evaluated at eP (i) (i) = e
∗ this equals
(κ)2 [q3 − (1− q)3] · v′′ ((2q − 1) e∗)− c′′ (e∗) .
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This is strictly negative; to see this, note that q3 > (1− q)3 and that v′′ is strictly negative
since the argument (2q − 1) e∗ is strictly positive, and recall that c′′ > 0). Hence, we can
first conclude that eP (i) (i) = e
∗ is a local maximum. However, for e∗ to be an equilibrium it
must also be a global maximum. This is what we show next.
e∗ is a global maximum if the second derivative in (45) is negative for all eP (i) (i) ∈ [0, 1].





eP (i) (i)− e∗
] )
+ (1− q)3 · v′′
(
− δ∗ + κ (1− q)
[

















A priori, condition (46) may fail to hold. To see this, let κ = 1 and eP (i) (i) = 0; then x < 0,




e∗ − eP (i) (i)
])
= v′′ (−qe∗) > 0. Although the
second partial derivative in (45) may thus be positive for some eP (i)(i) ∈ [0, 1], we will now
show that it changes sign at most once. This implies that for any given e∗, U is quasi-concave
in eP (i)(i) for eP (i)(i) ∈ [0, 1], a property which ensures that the local maximum eP (i)(i) = e∗
is also a global maximum in [0, 1].
For U to be quasi-concave, it suffices that the second partial derivative in (45) be decreas-
ing in eP (i)(i). If c
′′′(e) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ [0, 1] (one of the conditions stated in the proposition),
it suffices that the left-hand side of (46) is decreasing in eP (i)(i) for this to be true. If
v′′′(e) ≥ 0 (the other condition stated in the proposition), then the left-hand side of (46) is
decreasing in eP (i)(i) if the arguments of v
′′ (that is, x and −x−κ[e∗−eP (i)(i)]) are increasing
in eP (i)(i). This is clearly true, as revealed by inspection of the expression for x in (47) and
the fact that −x− κ[e∗ − eP (i)(i)] = −(2q − 1)e∗ + κ(1− q)[eP (i)(i)− e∗]. Q.E.D.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 8
By some abuse of notation, let ê denote the function that to each pair (κ, q) ∈ (0, 1]× [1/2, 1]





[q2 + (1− q)2] v′(δ̂)
c′(ê)− κ2(2q − 1) [q2 + (1− q)2] v′′(δ̂)
, (48)
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κ [2q − 2(1− q)] v′(δ̂) + 2κ2(2q − 1) [q2 + (1− q)2] êv′′(δ̂)





























Application of the same logic as the one used in the proof of Proposition 4 leads to the stated
result. Q.E.D.
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